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Abstract The aim of this paper is to study different regulatory effects on termination charges
and social welfare. We employ a framework with a ￿xed network and two mobile networks
competing in a market to study the following regulatory regimes: collusive and social welfare-
maximising reciprocity, uniform termination charge, asymmetric regulation, and direct calling
price. We incorporate the idea of partial consumer ignorance when calling to a mobile user and
allow the network operator to discriminate between on-net and off-net calls by setting differen-
tial calling prices. Compared to the uniform termination charge and asymmetric regulation, it
is shown in this paper that the regulator can improve social welfare, without too much interven-
tion, by imposing reciprocity on termination charges. We also ￿nd that with stronger consumer
ignorance the regulator is more capable of improving social welfare. Further we show that, de-
pending upon the extent of consumer ignorance, direct regulation of calling prices may be a
welfare-improving alternative over regulation of termination charges.
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The markets for mobile telecommunications are typically oligopoly due to the barrier to entry.
Although the introduction of mobile virtual network operators has increased competition, net-
work operators are still considered monopolies because of the exclusive position on providing
services in their own network. Therefore, regulation remains the main issue and interest in the
telecommunications industry.
The interconnection behaviour and termination charges have played an important role in
the recent research in telecommunications. Much research is based on the framework of Laf-
font, Rey, and Tirole[13][14] - henceforth LRTa and LRTb. They introduce two often adopted
assumptions, balanced calling pattern and reciprocal termination charge, and suggest that a
negotiated termination charge above marginal cost may be used as a collusive device to soften
the competition.1
Gans and King[11] introduce the idea of consumer ignorance. They argue that ￿consumers
are often unable to identify which speci￿c network they are calling to and are likely to base
their calling decision on an average price rather than on actual prices.￿ They show that the
horizontal spearation effect follows the existence of consumer ignorance and pushes mobile
termination charges and calling prices even higher than the monopoly level. Wright[20] con-
￿rms the excessive termination charges in Gans and King[11] and further suggests that a com-
mon (reciprocal) termination charge is a requirement to prevent mobile network operators from
setting a termination charge above the monopoly level.
The introduction of number portability enables telephone users to retain their telephone
numbers when changing to different networks. It makes networks even more indistinguishable
and exacerbates consumer ignorance. Buehler and Haucap[3] argue that the welfare effects of
1The reciprocal charge is when the two networks charge each other same termination fees. LRTa ￿gures
that regulators and antitrust authorities are likely to insist on the reciprocity of termination charges in the future.
According to Ofcom[15] the mandatory reciprocity is one of the regulation options for the future termination
regime on mobile network after 2001.
1introducing mandatory mobile number portability is ambiguous and suggest that the mobile
number portability is less likely to improve social welfare (i) the closer substitutes the mobile
networks are, and (ii) the larger the market for ￿xed network telephony is.
Based on the framework of Gans and King[11], in section 2 we develop the basic model
where one ￿xed network and two mobile networks compete in the market. Unlike other papers
which usually ignore the mobile-to-mobile (MTM) or mobile-to-￿xed (MTF) calls for simplic-
ity, we consider a more complete case where subscribers call to all networks, including MTM,
MTF and ￿xed-to-mobile (FTM) calls, to move closer to reality. In addition, we incorporate
the idea of partial consumer ignorance (toward mobile networks) when calling to a mobile
user and allow the network operator to set discriminatory calling prices for on-net and off-net
calls.2 To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper taking the different extent of con-
sumer ignorance when calling to different networks into account. Gans and King[11] assume
that consumers are unable to distinguish the calls terminating in a mobile network from the
calls terminating in the ￿xed network. This complete consumer ignorance results in a uniform
pricing scheme in which the network operator will only set a uniform price for originating
calls regardless of which network the calls are terminated since the outcome of discriminatory
pricing is equivalent to the outcome of uniform pricing.3 By separating the consumer’s ability
on identifying the telephone numbers for mobile and for ￿xed networks, it not only re￿ects the
current reality but also allows us to analyse the issues of discriminatory prices. We then study
the different regulatory effects on termination charges and social welfare.
It is already known that the reciprocal termination charge can eliminate the problem of
double-marginalisation(verticalseparation)whichhappenswhenallthenetworkshavemonopoly
power and usually pushes prices above the monopoly level. It also excludes the possibility
of unstable or corner solution.4 For the above reasons, the implementation of reciprocity is
considered to be a ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime to improve social welfare. Therefore, in
2Currently, in most countries, number portability is only available on transferring within mobile networks or
within local ￿xed networks. The United States, Canada and Iceland are the only three countries that offer full
number portability transferring between both ￿xed and mobile networks.
3Wright[20] and Buehler and Haucap[3] consider only FTM calls. Under their assumptions, the mobile sub-
scribersdonotcallothermobileusersandtheyalsoignoreMTFcallsbecausetheirpricesaresetatmarginalcosts.
Therefore there is no need to consider the complete consumer ignorance between mobile and ￿xed networks.
4For the proof see Economides, Lopomo and Woroch[9].
2section 3, we study collusive reciprocal termination charge as a benchmark and ￿nd that the
collusive reciprocal termination charge will result in a monopoly outcome. To achieve max-
imum welfare, the socially optimal termination charge should be set below-cost unless the
market sizes of the networks are signi￿cantly asymmetric.
We then study different regulatory regimes in section 4. We start at the uniform termination
charge to investigate the effect of vertical and horizontal separation and then examine the often
adopted asymmetric regulation on the ￿xed network. Both regimes are found to be inferior to
the collusive reciprocal regime. We also study the direct calling price regulation and suggest
that it favors the small network and increases consumer surplus. It may be a better regime
compared to the collusive reciprocity in terms of social welfare. In section 5, we extend our
discussion to complete consumer ignorance and show that the regulatory outcome may be
reversed if the extent of consumer ignorance is very strong. We conclude in section 6.
2 The Model and Assumptions
We consider a telecommunications industry with two independent mobile networks and a ￿xed
network. To simplify the strategic interaction between network operators and focus on the
decisive factor of termination charges, we assume that the market sizes of the networks are
exogenous. The assumption of exogenous market share can be applied to a mature market
where the market shares are almost ￿xed or to the case when the switching cost is high.5
We assume that the total number of consumers is ￿xed and each consumer subscribes to
a network. We segment the telecommunications subscription market into ￿xed and mobile
network sectors, and the market sizes are assumed ￿xed. The market sizes of mobile network
1, mobile network 2, and the ￿xed network are denoted by n, 1￿n, and s respectively. The two
5The assumption of exogenous markets shares is also employed by Gans and King[11], Armstrong[2], Dewen-
ter and Haucap[8] since it has proven extremely dif￿cult to analyse termination rates with endogenous market
shares, as the optimization problem is no longer supermodular (Buehler[4]).
One justi￿cation of exogenous market share is that switching to a different network involves some costs. For
example, the subscriber need to inform others the change of his number, and it takes time to compare prices
for different networks and familiar to the functional services of the new network. Therefore consumers may not
switch to other networks over the relevant range of tariffs.
The case of exogenous market share can also be considered when the networks are not strong substitutes, for
example if different networks cover different regions or consumer groups.
3mobile networks share a market with the consumer base normalised to 1, and the parameter s
can be interpreted as the relative market size of the ￿xed sector to the mobile sector.
We assume that the networks have the same cost and their marginal costs for originating
and terminating a call are both c. Therefore the actual total marginal cost to complete a call
is 2c. However, when launching an off-net call, the termination network j will charge the
origination network i a price denoted by tij , where i; j D 1;2; F and i 6D j are associated
with mobile network 1, 2 and the ￿xed network. This termination charge may differ from
the marginal cost for terminating a call. Consequently, the perceived marginal cost that the
network operator i faces to complete an off-net call is c C tij.
We assume that the consumers are charged linear prices and denote pi1; pi2 and piF as
the discriminatory prices for calling to network 1, 2 and the ￿xed network respectively from
network i.6 While consumers cannot identify which mobile network they are calling to, they
usually are able to distinguish the numbers for the ￿xed network from those for mobile net-
works. Therefore we assume that consumer ignorance exists only when the calls are made
to a mobile network. We refer this case as partial consumer ignorance to differentiate from
complete consumer ignorance in which the consumers cannot even recognise the difference
between the ￿xed and mobile numbers. Because of partial consumer ignorance, the consumers
only consider the average price when making calls to a mobile network. The expected price
for consumers in network i to call a person in a mobile network is the weighted average of
the calling prices to mobile networks, with weights given by the market shares of mobile net-
works. That is piM D npi1 C .1 ￿ n/pi2, i D 1;2; F. Therefore, even though the network
operators could set a differential price for calling to different mobile networks, the results are
equivalent to the case when the networks are unable to discriminate different mobile networks.
For this reason, we assume that the network operators set a uniform price for calls to mobile
networks, i:e: pi1 D pi2 D piM, but a discriminatory price piF for calls to the ￿xed network.
The framework is as shown in Figure 1.
6According to Carter and Wright[6], ￿one justi￿cation for using linear prices is that they appear common
practice. In New Zealand, Clear and Telecom ultimately agreed a linear price...￿ Although two-part tariffs and
other pricing schemes are very common, most prepaid phone card or pay-as-you-go schemes nowadays are still
charged linear prices.
4Figure 1: The framework
We assume that consumers are homogenous in their calling pattern. Given the price pij,
a representative consumer in network i has demand of qij call minutes to call a person in
network j, and derives utility u.qij/ from the calls to a given person. Following Gabrielsen





where a;b > 0; which gives a linear demand function for call minutes
qij D a ￿ bpij:
The linear demand assumption is often adopted in the literature since it allows us to explic-
itly calculate the equilibrium values, for example prices and termination charges here, and to
compare the equilibrium values over different regimes.
Furthermore, following LRTa and LRTb, we employ balanced calling patterns with which
a consumer has an equal chance of calling a given consumer belonging to her network and
another belonging to the rival networks. Therefore, the percentage of on-net calls of a net-
work will equal the market share of that network. The pro￿t of each network is composed of
5origination pro￿t and termination pro￿t, and are given as
￿1 D n
￿
.p1M ￿ 2c/nq1M C .p1M ￿ c ￿ t12/.1 ￿ n/q1M C .p1F ￿ c ￿ t1F/sq1F
￿
| {z }
pro￿t from originating calls
Cn
￿
.t21 ￿ c/.1 ￿ n/q21 C .tF1 ￿ c/sqF1
￿
| {z }
pro￿ts from terminating calls
: (1)
￿2 D .1 ￿ n/
￿
.p2M ￿ c ￿ t21/nq2M C .p2M ￿ 2c/.1 ￿ n/q2M C .p2F ￿ c ￿ t2F/sq2F
￿
| {z }
pro￿t from originating calls
C.1 ￿ n/
￿
.t12 ￿ c/nq12 C .tF2 ￿ c/sqF2
￿
| {z }
pro￿ts from terminating calls
: (2)
￿ F D s
￿
.pFM ￿ c ￿ tF1/nqF1 C .pFM ￿ c ￿ tF2/.1 ￿ n/qF2 C .pFF ￿ 2c/sqFF
￿
| {z }
pro￿t from originating calls
Cs
￿
.t1F ￿ c/nq1F C .t2F ￿ c/.1 ￿ n/q2F
￿
| {z }
pro￿ts from terminating calls
: (3)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the regulator values consumer surplus and indus-
try pro￿t equally so the welfare is measured by the sum of consumer surplus and network
operators’ pro￿ts, given by


















denotes the consumer surplus and is derived from our assumption of linear demand function.
Due to the complexity and the dif￿culty of acquiring detailed information to set different
socially optimal termination charges for different networks according to their respective cir-
cumstances, the welfare-maximising regulation is not usually practicable. Therefore, we use
the collusive reciprocal termination charge as the benchmark case to investigate whether the
regulator can improve the social welfare without a great deal of intervention.7 This is a two-
stage game in which networks ￿rst negotiate reciprocal termination charges and then choose
their retail prices simultaneously. We solve the game by backward induction.
7The assumption of reciprocal termination charge is often employed in the literature, for examples see LRTa,
LRTb and Cambini and Valletti[5].
63 Benchmark: Collusive Reciprocal Termination Charge
Although the reciprocity can be mandated by the regulator, the networks still need to nego-
tiate pairwise over termination charges without further regulation. In this section, we study
collusive reciprocal termination outcomes as the non-regulatory benchmark case. The termi-
nation charges tij D tji are decided between the associated pairs i and j through the process of
negotiation. For convenience, we denote tm D t12 D t21; t1 D t1F D tF1; and t2 D t2F D tF2:
￿ Price competition
At the second stage, the network operators decide the calling prices piM and piF; i D 1;2; F,
simultaneously and non-cooperatively to maximise their own pro￿ts. Differentiating the pro￿t

























.a C 2bc/ . (11)
Note that termination charge has positive effect not only on the calling price for off-net
calls but also for on-net calls when there is consumer ignorance. From equations (6), (8) and
(11) we can see that the mobile networks’ on-net prices are in￿uenced by the MTM termination
charge while the ￿xed network’s on-net calling price is set to the monopoly level 1
2b .a C 2bc/.
The price for calling to a mobile network piM is positively (negatively) affected by the rival
mobile network’s market size if the termination charge is set above (below) the marginal cost.
7When the rival network has larger market share, more calls will be terminated off-net. This
results in a higher expected cost to complete a call and consequently a higher calling price if
the termination charge is above the marginal cost. When the MTM termination charge equals
the marginal cost .tm D c/, the mobile network operators will set p1M D p2M D 1
2b .a C 2bc/,
same as the monopoly level.
￿ The collusive termination charge
Taking into account the equilibrium prices derived at the stage 2, each two network operators
negotiate their reciprocal termination charge without regulator’s intervention at the ￿rst stage.8
The reciprocal MTM, ￿xed-to-mobile network 1 (termed FTM1), ￿xed-to-mobile network 2






￿1 C ￿ F; (12)
t2 D argmax
t2
￿2 C ￿ F.
After substituting equations (6)￿(11) into (1)￿(3), we solve the ￿rst order conditions si-




2 D c: (13)
We obtain an outcome different from Gans and King[11]. They suggest that unregulated
collusive termination charges will be set above the marginal costs due to the horizontal and
vertical separation effects. In our model, the reciprocity removes both effects and the collusive
termination charges are set equal to the marginal cost.9
Substituting (13) into equations (6)￿(11) yields
8We suppose that pro￿t transfer between networks is available and costless. For simplicity, we further assume
that the network operators have equivalent power on negotiating a collusive termination charge.
9If the cost is asymmetric, the collusive termination charges will be equal to the associated network’s average
marginal costs weighted by their market sizes. That is, t1 D cFCnc1
1Cn ; t2 D 1
1C.1￿n/ .nc2 ￿ cF ￿ c2/; and tm D






.a C 2bc/: (14)
The network operator will set a uniform monopoly price for originating a call regardless of
which network the call terminates at. Because of the monopoly power over its own subscribers,





.a ￿ 2bc/2.1 C s/￿i; (15)
where ￿i D n; 1 ￿ n, s denotes the market share of each network i.
Substituting t￿
i and p￿




.1 C s/2 .a ￿ 2bc/2 : (16)
Gans and King[11] consider only the FTM calls and do not consider the calls from mobile
networks to the ￿xed network. The mobile network operator can thus unilaterally decide the
FTM termination charge and have an incentive to set a high termination rate. In our two-way
access model with negotiated reciprocal termination charge, a high termination charge not only
increasestheassociatedrivalnetwork’scostbutalsoitsowncost, whichconsequentlyincreases
the calling price and decreases the call volume. When the reciprocity is mandated, the network
operatorswill internalisethiseffectand thushaveincentivesto lowerthecharge tothemarginal
cost. The double-marginalisation problem is eliminated because of the collusion.10
Although the negotiated reciprocal termination charge drags the collusive termination rate
down to the marginal cost, the monopoly calling prices infer that, to increase the social welfare,
the socially desirable prices should be set lower. The following subsection investigates how
the regulator can in￿uence the prices to improve welfare via the optimal choice of termination
charge and the role of consumer ignorance in it.
10Instead of negotiating between network operators, if we make an extraordinary assumption that the regulator
grants the mobile network operators the rights to decide the reciprocal termination charges, this collusive outcome
will still come out. The mandatory reciprocity diminishes the decision maker’s advantage.
This result also applies to the case with a dominant network which is capable of setting its termination charge
before other network operators set theirs. The ￿rst-mover advantage of the dominant network is as well dimin-
ished by the reciprocity.
9￿ Comparison between collusive and social welfare-maximising outcome
If the reciprocal termination charges were decided by a social welfare maximising regulator
instead, she would solve the following problem,
max
tm; t1; t2
W D CS C ￿1 C ￿2 C ￿ F:















.a ￿ 3bc/: (18)
The comparison of termination charges gives the following observation.
Observation 1: (i) The socially optimal termination charges are below the marginal cost (D
collusive termination rate).
(ii) The socially optimal MTM termination charge is lower than the FTM (MTF) termina-
tion charge.
Proof. Immediately proved by comparing equations between (17), (18) and the marginal cost
as below,12
(i) tS
m ￿ c D ￿
2
b
.a ￿ 2bc/ < 0 and tS
i ￿ c D ￿
1
b






.a ￿ 2bc/ < 0.
To induce network operators to set a lower calling price, the regulator needs to set a termi-
nation charge below the marginal cost. This result supports the often suggested regime ‘bill-
and-keep’ when the implementation of socially optimal regulation is not possible.13 The neg-
11If the objective of the regulator is W D !CS C .1 ￿ !/.￿1 C ￿2 C ￿ F/, The interior maximisation results
exist only when ! < 2
3.
12Throughout the paper we assume that a > 2bc to ensure suf￿cient demand.
13Bill-and-keep is a zero reciprocal termination charge scheme and there is no monetary transfer between the
networks: calls are made and bills are kept. The advantage of this approach is the savings from low transaction,
10ative termination charges also infer lower calling prices under the welfare-maximising regime
compare to the collusive one. Therefore, instead of comparing the prices with those under the
collusive termination charge, we are more interested in whether an optimal termination charge
can lead the calling price to the marginal cost level.
We then derive the equilibrium prices by substituting the socially optimal termination



















.a C 2bc/: (22)
By setting a termination charge below marginal cost, the regulator induces network opera-
tors to set an off-net calling price equal to the true marginal costs pS
ij D 2c, which is shown in
equation (21). While the ￿xed network still charges a monopoly on-net price, the regulator can
take advantage of partial consumer ignorance to in￿uence the mobile networks’ on-net price
by choosing an optimal termination charge. From equation (19) and (20) we can see that since
a small network originates more off-net calls and consequently faces a lower expected cost
to complete a call with a below-cost termination charge, it charges a calling price below the
actual cost 2c. On the contrary, a large network charges a calling price above the actual cost.
Althought the calling prices between mobile networks deviate from the marginal cost when the
sizes of mobile networks are asymmetric, the average calling prices to a mobile network will be
equal to the actual marginal cost for completing a call.14 With consumer ignorance, the regula-
tor can use termination charge as an instrument to achieve a more ef￿cient outcome. However,
the network operator loses its pro￿t in originating on-net calls with consumer ignorance and
therefore will prefer to make it’s numbers identi￿able.
accounting and billing costs. However, we will prove that ‘bill-and-keep’ is considered to be a better regime only
if there is no signi￿cant asymmetry in the network’s market sizes in Section 5.




11Substituting price equations (19)￿(22) into the pro￿t equations (1)￿(3) and the welfare





















4n.1 ￿ n/ C 8s C 3s2 C 3
i
: (26)
Although the aggregate pro￿t in the mobile market is positive, the large mobile network
may suffer loss because of the negative termination pro￿t.15 Therefore the lump sum transfer
may be needed to compensate the large network. The maximum social welfare is achieved
when the mobile network operators have an equal market share. Substituting n D 1
2 into
equations (23) and (24) we can see that both mobile networks make no pro￿t in the case of
symmetric size.
4 Possible Regulatory Regimes
In this section, we study various regulatory approaches that could be introduced by the regula-
tor and compare their effects to that of the collusive reciprocal termination charge. Beginning
with the uniform termination charge and the asymmetric regulation on the ￿xed network, we
then consider direct price regulation.
4.1 Uniform termination charge
Instead of mandatory reciprocity, the networks operator may be required to set a uniform
(nondiscriminatory) termination charge for terminating calls, regardless of which network the
calls originated from.16 We denote tU




4b￿1 .1 ￿ 2n/2 .a ￿ 2bc/2 > 0 if n 6D 1
2: Furthermore, it is observed that small mobile network
might bene￿t from the negative termination charge compare to the collusive regime.
16Uniform termination charge was once recommended by Oftel (The Of￿ce of Telecommunications). On
Oftel[16] states that ￿Oftel believes consumers would bene￿t from a uniform rate for charges from ￿xed to
12terminating the calls. That is, tU
j D tij where i; j D 1;2; F and i 6D j. The pro￿t functions




.p1M ￿ 2c/nq1M C .p1M ￿ c ￿ tU











2 D .1 ￿ n/
￿
.p2M ￿ c ￿ tU













.pFM ￿ c ￿ tU
1 /nqF1 C .pFM ￿ c ￿ tU





F ￿ c/nq1F C .tU
F ￿ c/.1 ￿ n/q2F
￿
: (29)
Differentiating the pro￿t equations (27)￿(29) with respect to prices (piM and piF/ and






a C bc C bcn C btU

















a C bc C bntU

















.a C 2bc/: (34)
Substituting equations (30)￿(34) into the pro￿t equations (27)￿(29), network operators
then choose a termination charge simultaneously and noncooperatively to maximise their own
pro￿ts. The equilibrium uniform termination charges are solved as follows,
mobile networks. This is particularly the case with number portability for mobile numbers available from 1
January 1999.￿ It also states that ￿Uniform retail prices (for an individual originating operator) for calls to all
mobile networks would be appropriate. This would imply that uniform termination rates on all mobile networks
would also be appropriate.￿
13tU
1 D
.2n C 2s ￿ 2n2 C s2 ￿ ns/.a ￿ 2bc/ C ncb
￿
4n C 4s ￿ 4n2 C 3s2￿
￿





.s ￿ n C 1/.2n C s/.a ￿ 2bc/ C .1 ￿ n/cb
￿
4n C 4s ￿ 4n2 C 3s2￿
￿










Observation 2 (Horizontal separation effect (Gans and King[11])/: The mobile network’s
termination charge is decreasing in its own market size while increasing in its rival mobile
network’s market size.
Proof. See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
We can get the equilibrium calling prices pU
ij, pro￿ts ￿U
i and social welfare WU by substi-
tuting tU
j into (27)￿(34) and welfare function (4). The outcomes are listed in Appendix A.1.
We then compare the uniform termination outcomes with the collusive reciprocal outcomes
and summarise the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Compared to the outcomes of the reciprocal termination charge, the uniform
termination charge regime yields;
(i) higher termination charge and higher calling prices except for the ￿xed on-net calls,
which remains at the monopoly level as in the reciprocal termination regime;
(ii) higher pro￿t for small mobile network while lower pro￿t for large mobile network and
the ￿xed network;
(iii) lower industry pro￿t, consumer surplus and social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
Without the implementation of reciprocity, both horizontal and vertical separation effects
exist in the uniform termination charge regime. The off-net and MTM calling prices are there-
fore pushed beyond the monopoly level. A mobile network with suf￿ciently small market
size can take advantage of consumer ignorance and make more pro￿t from terminating calls,
14whereas the ￿xed and the large mobile networks both make less pro￿t. The excessive calling
prices are detrimental for the aggregate industry pro￿t and consumer’s bene￿t, and therefore
decrease social welfare.17
4.2 Asymmetric regulation on the ￿xed network
Because of its monopoly and dominant position, ￿xed networks have been subjected to various
regulations around the world. We follow the most often adopted assumption that the termina-
tion charge for MTF calls is regulated at marginal cost while the FTM and MTM termination
charges are left unregulated.18
Here we assume that the termination charge of the ￿xed network for terminating calls
from mobile networks are regulated to its marginal cost c, that is t1F D t2F D c; while the
mobile network operators cooperatively decide tm. The unregulated mobile network operators
retain the right to charge a termination price different from their costs and decide tF1 and tF2
unilaterally to maximise their pro￿ts.
At the second stage, the three network operators decide the calling prices b pR
ij simultane-















[a C bc C bnt1 C bt2.1 ￿ n/]; (40)
b pR
1F D b pU




.a C 2bc/: (41)
The FTM termination charges are now unilaterally decided by mobile network operators
17Complete consumer ignorance will enhance the horizontal effect and even more harmful from the social
welfare’s perspective.
18Ewers[10] states that ￿National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) from various EU members have obliged
incumbent ￿xed network operators to provide call termination on their network at cost-oriented rates and in a non-
discriminatory manner, while mobile network operators are not forced to apply cost-oriented rates for terminating
calls on their networks.￿ Also see Peitz[17][18] for theoretical analysis to justify the intention to encourage the
expansion of mobile penetration when the mobile industry is newly introduced.
15while the MTM termination charge is negotiated by the two mobile network operators at the
￿rst stage. The termination charges are obtained as below,
t R
m D argmax ￿1 C ￿2 (42)
D c;
t R




.a ￿ 2bc C 3bcn/;
t R




.a C bc ￿ 3bcn/:
and we summarise the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i)Withasymmetricregulationonthe￿xednetwork, theFTMterminationcharges
are set above the marginal cost. Consequently, the ￿xed network charges a price higher than
the monopoly level while the unregulated mobile networks set calling prices at the monopoly
level.
(ii) While mobile networks bene￿t from the asymmetric regulation, the aggregate industry
pro￿t is lower than that without the regulation. Social welfare deteriorates when only the ￿xed
network is regulated.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.2.
The mobile network operators not only enjoy the monopoly power toward their own net-
works but also the decision power over the ￿xed network operator. While the MTM termi-
nation charge remains equal to the marginal cost, the unregulated mobile networks not only
set the monopoly calling prices but also take advantage of asymmetric regulation to increase
their termination pro￿ts by setting higher FTM termination charges. The standard double-
marginalisation effect and the horizontal effect appear due to the lack of power of the regu-
lated network on negotiation. This results in higher FTM termination charges and excessive
FTM calling prices. Not only that consumers are worse off, the aggregate industry pro￿t also
16decreases since the loss in the ￿xed market surpasses the gain in the mobile market. Social
welfare is consequently decreased.
4.3 Direct calling price regulation
Until now our discussion has focused on the regulation of termination charges. In this section
we will investigate the effect of regulating the prices in the retail market to examine whether it
would be an ideal alternative to the regulation on termination charges.
Assume that the regulator directly sets the calling prices at the expected perceived marginal
costs and leaves the termination charges unregulated. The regulatory calling price for an on-
net call is therefore pii D 2c while the price for an off-net call is pij D c C tj. Recall that
the expected price for calling to a mobile network is piM D npi1 C .1 ￿ n/pi2. Imposing
reciprocity, the regulatory calling prices are given as follows,
b pD
1M D n.2c/ C .1 ￿ n/.c C tm/; (45)
b pD
1F D c C t1; (46)
b pD
2M D n.c C tm/ C .1 ￿ n/.2c/; (47)
b pD
2F D c C t2; (48)
b pD
FM D n.c C t1/ C .1 ￿ n/.c C t2/; (49)
pD
FF D 2c: (50)
Note that from (50) the price for ￿xed on-net calls is equal to the true marginal cost. The
network operators negotiate pairwise a collusive termination charge to maximise their joint










[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]b




[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]b
[4a C .2a ￿ 4bc/n C 3bcn.1 ￿ n/]: (53)
17If the calling prices are regulated at perceived marginal cost, network operators have in-
centives to negotiate a higher termination charge compared to the true termination cost c to
increase the perceived cost and consequently increase the calling price. Substituting (51)￿(53)
into (45)￿(50) and (1)￿(4), the equilibrium prices, pro￿ts and social welfare are solved. We
derive the outcomes in Appendix A.3.
We then compare the equilibrium outcomes with the unregulated collusive ones and sum-
marise the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Compared to the collusive reciprocal termination charge, direct regulation of
calling prices yields;
(i) lower calling price for FTF calls while higher price for FTM and MTF calls;
(ii) higher MTM calling prices for small mobile network and lower prices for the large
network;
(iii) higher pro￿t for the small mobile network but lower pro￿t for the large and the ￿xed
network;
(iv) lower industry pro￿t, higher consumer surplus and social welfare when the market
share is asymmetric.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.3.
The distortion of the termination charge results in an excessive off-net calling prices while
the on-net price is successfully lowered to the true cost. Because more (less) calls are ter-
minated off-net, a small (large) mobile network is expecting a higher (lower) perceived cost
when originating a call to a mobile user. This implies a MTM calling price above (below) the
monopoly level for the small (large) network. The average MTM calling price is lower since it
has more weight on the large network’s price.
With lower average MTM calling price, consumers make more calls to a given mobile user.
The small mobile network can therefore bene￿t from the increases in both price and calling
volume for MTM calls, whereas the large network makes less pro￿t due to a lower price. In
terms of the pro￿t from originating MTF calls, both mobile networks are worse off because
of the excessive calling price and the decreased demand. The regulatory calling pricing harms
18the ￿xed network since the regulation not only lowers demand for its off-net calls but also
prohibits it from charging a monopoly price for on-net calls.
Although the introduction of the regulatory calling price will not be welcomed from the in-
dustry’s perspective due to the decreased industry pro￿t, it may bene￿t the consumers because
of the cheaper MTM average calling price and a cheaper FTF price. The effect is reinforced
with the asymmetric market size of mobile networks, and with the size of the ￿xed network.
This advantage will outweigh the disadvantages associated with less MTF and FTM calls and
the decreased industry pro￿t. In aggregate, direct calling price regulation is superior to collu-
sive reciprocal termination charge from the social welfare perspective in this case.
5 Complete Consumer Ignorance
In this section we examine how the extent of consumer ignorance in￿uences the regulatory
results with two examples: the welfare-maximising termination charges and direct price reg-
ulation.19 The availability of number portability between mobile and ￿xed networks in the
United States and Canada can be a justi￿cation for us to extend consumer ignorance from the
mobile networks only to the whole telecommunications market. We refer the latter case as
complete consumer ignorance to distinguish it from (partial) consumer ignorance we employ
in the previous sections.
While all the other notations and assumptions remain the same, with complete consumer
ignorance, the expected price for consumers in network i here is pi D ￿1pi1C￿2pi2C￿F piF
where pi is the uniform (or expected average) calling price charged by network i; and ￿1 D
n
1Cs, ￿2 D 1￿n
1Cs and ￿F D s
1Cs are each network operator’s market share relative to the whole
19The extent of consumer ignorance doesn’t in￿uence the monopoly-like outcomes with collusive reciprocal
termination. Complete consumer ignorance enhances the horizontal effect which appears in both regimes of
uniform termination charge and asymmetric regulation and therefore makes these two regulatory regimes even
more inferior to the collusive reciprocal termination regime from the social welfare perspective.
19subscription market 1 C s. The pro￿t functions can then be rearranged as follows,
￿1 D nq1
￿





.tm ￿ c/.1 ￿ n/q2 C .t1 ￿ c/sqF
￿
;
￿2 D .1 ￿ n/q2
￿





.tm ￿ c/nq1 C .t2 ￿ c/sqF
￿
;
￿ F D sqF
￿









Repeating all the steps as in section 3 we can get the following welfare-maximising termination
charge with complete consumer ignorance,
e tS
m D










.a ￿ 2bc/.s C 1/.2n ￿ s ￿ 1/ C 2bc.1 ￿ n/s
2n.1 ￿ n/b
: (59)
Comparing the above equations with the marginal cost yields the following results,
e tS
m ￿ c D ￿




1 ￿ c D ￿




2 ￿ c D ￿
.a ￿ 2bc/.1 C s/[.1 ￿ n/ C s ￿ n]
2n.1 ￿ n/b
: (62)
Recall that we have observed overall below-cost welfare-maximising termination charges
and therefore suggest that bill-and-keep is a welfare-improving policy compared to the cost-
20based regulation in the case of partial consumer ignorance. With complete consumer ignorance
here, however, imposing the bill-and-keep regulation on all the networks may not be a good
policy when there is signi￿cant asymmetry in networks’ market size.20 Take equation (60) for
example, we can see that if the aggregate market size of the mobile networks is smaller (larger)
than that of the ￿xed network, the regulated termination chargese tS
m should be set higher (lower)
than the actual marginal cost.
Substituting equations (57)￿(59) into the second stage equilibrium derived from the pro￿t-
maximising problems we obtain e pS
i D 2c and consequently e ￿S
i D 0, where i D 1;2; F. We
then substitutee tS
i , e pS
i and e ￿S
i into welfare equation (4) and obtain
e W S D
1
2b
.a ￿ 2bc/2.1 C s/:
We can examine the effect of the extent of consumer ignorance by comparing the social
welfare under complete consumer ignorance e W S with that under partial consumer ignorance
W S and report the ￿ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 With complete consumer ignorance, the ef￿cient perfect competition outcome
e pS
i D 2c and e ￿S
i D 0 can be achieved by the socially optimal termination charges. The social
welfare improves with complete consumer ignorance.
Proof. e W S ￿ W S D
1
8b
.a ￿ 2bc/2 ￿




complete consumer ignorance gives the regulator greater ability to control all the networks’
callingpricestoachievethe￿rst-bestoutcome. Eventhoughtheregulatorweighstheconsumer
surplus and networks’ pro￿ts equally, the pro￿ts are all transferred to the consumers and the
networks make no pro￿t.
20For the same reason, we can infer that the bill-and-keep may be a better policy with discrimination pricing
but may not be appropriate with uniform pricing when the market sizes of networks are asymmetric.
21￿ Direct calling price regulation
When imposing direct calling price regulation, regulatory calling price for on-net calls is pii D
2c while the price for off-net calls is pij D c C ti. The regulatory calling prices are therefore
given by
pD
1 D ￿1.2c/ C ￿2.c C tm/ C ￿F.c C t1/;
pD
2 D ￿1.c C tm/ C ￿2.2c/ C ￿F.c C t2/;
pD
F D ￿1.c C t1/ C ￿2.c C t2/ C ￿F.2c/:
Solving the decision problem in (12) we obtain the collusive termination charge with reg-





.a ￿ bc/; i D 1;2; F:
Substitutinge tD
i into pD
















We then substitutee tD
i and e pD























.1 ￿ n/2 C n2
i
s;




1 ￿ n C n2 C 2s C 2s2 C s3 C 4n2s ￿ 4ns
￿
:
22We can see that the effect of the direct calling price regulation by comparing the above
equilibrium outcomes with the unregulated collusive ones. The results are summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) when a network’s market share is smaller (larger) than its rivals’ aggregate
market share, it charges a price above (below) the monopoly level.
(ii) The direct price regulation advantages the smaller network but harms the larger net-
work. The distortion may be detrimental for both consumers and the industry, and conse-
quently decrease the social welfare.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix B.
Note that the direct calling price regulation decreases social welfare with complete con-
sumer ignorance while it improves social welfare with partial consumer ignorance.21 The
reason for this contradictory outcome is as follows. When consumer ignorance does not exist,
the prices for on-net calls are not in￿uenced by the excessive termination charges and can be
lowered to the level of true marginal costs. Although consumers suffer from the excessive off-
net calls, they bene￿t from the low price for on-net calls. With complete consumer ignorance,
both on-net and off-net calling prices are in￿uenced by the excessive termination charge and
this disadvantages consumer surplus.22
6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Although the telecommunications markets have been liberalised and competition has been fos-
tered, the need of regulators’ intervention is suggested across the world. Using a framework
where a ￿xed network and two mobile networks compete in a market in the presence of con-
sumer ignorance, we have studied different regulatory regimes: collusive and social welfare-
maximising reciprocity, uniform termination charge, asymmetric regulation on the ￿xed net-
work, and direct calling price regulation.
21Similarly, we can infer that the direct calling price may be a better policy with discrimination pricing scheme
but not when uniform pricing is employ.
22It can be checked that .e pD
1 C e pD
2 C e pD
F / > .p￿
1 C p￿
2 C p￿
F/, the average price increases with direct calling
price regulation. This implies that the consumers are worse off under the regulatory calling prices regime.
23We have found that with the existence of consumer ignorance, the termination charge not
only affects off-net calls but also on-net calls since the consumer cannot distinguish on-net
calls from off-net ones. Therefore the regulatory effect of termination charge will be rein-
forced. Depending on the different regulatory regimes, the in￿uence of consumer ignorance
can be either positive or negative. Given that the termination charge is regulated at the socially
optimal level, the regulator can achieve a more ef￿cient regulatory outcome with a greater
extent of consumer ignorance, while it is detrimental for the dominant (larger) network. The
result provides an explanation why the dominant network operators are usually against the
implementation of number portability whereas the regulators across countries require mobile
number portability.23
It is clear from the EU and the UK experience that the approach and the extent of regulation
have been kept under review as market conditions change. Uniform termination charge was
once recommended by Oftel. It was proposed in the statement of Oftel[16] that ￿...consumers
would bene￿t from a uniform rate for charges from ￿xed to mobile networks. This is partic-
ularly the case with number portability for mobile numbers available from 1 January 1999.￿
However our ￿ndings have suggested that this statement is fallacious. We have shown that both
vertical and horizontal separation effects exist when a uniform termination charge is adopted,
which lead to an excessive termination rate. Moreover, contrary to the advice of Oftel, we
have found that the existence of consumer ignorance will enhance the horizontal separation ef-
fect and make the uniform termination regime even more inadequate from the social welfare’s
perspective.
The asymmetric regulation which applies to incumbent or dominant network operators
only is a common practice. In Europe, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are required
to impose regulations on those operators with signi￿cant market power. The incumbent ￿xed
network operators are often obliged to provide termination at cost-based rates while mobile
network operators are free from this obligation. We have demonstrated that the asymmetric
regulationshouldberemoved, soonasthesustainablecompetitionisensured, sinceitdecreases
both industry and consumer welfare.
23Onejusti￿cationisthatthenumberprotabilityreducesswitchingcostandthereforeincreasesthecompetition.
See Buehler and Haucap[3] for detailed discussion.
24In fact, Ofcom recently launched a debate about the future termination regime on mobile
networks after 2011. According to Ofcom[15] the options include: (1) incremental costs only;
(2) reciprocity between ￿xed and mobile; (3) bill-and-keep; (4) deregulate mobile termination;
and (5) deregulate all termination. From our analysis we may recommend bill-and-keep on
condition that the market shares of network operators are not too asymmetric. Otherwise the
regulator can improve social welfare, without too much intervention, simply by imposing reci-
procity on termination charges. Mandatory reciprocity between ￿xed and mobile will help to
eliminate both vertical and horizontal separation effects and bring the termination rate to the
level of marginal cost. It bears similar regulatory effect of incremental costs regulation while
saves the costs for the regulator to monitor the network operators’ cost structures.
Direct calling price regulation may be a welfare-improving alternative instead of regulating
termination charges on condition that the consumers are not completely ignorant about the
network they are calling to. Although it is detrimental to the industrial pro￿ts, it favours the
small network and consumers.
Finally, we suggest that the extent of consumer ignorance has a crucial effect on the reg-
ulatory outcomes. The regulator is more capable of manipulating the termination charge to
improve the social welfare when the extent of consumer ignorance is high. However, we have
also demonstrated that greater extent of consumer ignorance may adversely affect the welfare-
improving outcomes of direct calling price regulation. Therefore the regulator should be re-
minded to take the extent of consumer ignorance into consideration since the same regulation
may have opposite results with different extent of consumer ignorance.
25Appendix
Throughout the analysis in Appendix, we assume that the market size of the ￿xed network is
not extremely different from the mobile market and therefore take the value 0:5 ￿ s ￿ 1:5 for
the ￿xed network’s market size.
A Possible Regulatory Regimes: Proof
A.1 Uniform termination charge
￿ The proof for Observation 2.
We take tU






.a ￿ 2bc/ A1
￿









￿ 8.n C s/
￿
n C s C n3
￿
;
decides the sign of
@tU
1
@n : It is shown in Figure (A.1.1) that A1 < 0 which implies that the
uniform termination charge is decreasing in its own market share.
We then partially differentiate tU





.a ￿ 2bc/ A2
￿
4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿2 .1 ￿ n/2 b
> 0;
where






2n3 ￿ n2 ￿ ns ￿ 1
￿
;
26decides the sign of
@tU
2
@n : Figure (A.1.2) shows that A2 > 0 and the uniform termination charge
is increasing in the rival mobile’s market share.
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￿ The equilibrium outcomes with the optimal uniform termination charge
pU
1M D
2.1 ￿ n/n .3a C 2bc/ C sn .a ￿ 2bc/ C 4s2 .a C bc/ C s .5a C 6bc/
2
￿







n C s ￿ n2￿
.3a C 2bc/ ￿ sn.a ￿ 2bc/ C 4s2 .a C bc/
2
￿





8na .1 ￿ n/ C 2scb.s C 1/ C sa .5s C 7/
2
￿


















4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿2
￿.64ns C 32n2 ￿ 80n3 C 64n4 ￿ 16n5 C 32s2 C 64s3 C 40s4 C 8s5 C 68ns2 C 9ns5






4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿2
￿.32ns C 16n2 ￿ 16n3 ￿ 16n4 C 16n5 C 16s2 C 56s3 C 56s4 C 17s5






4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2
i￿2
b￿1 .a ￿ 2bc/2 s
￿.32ns C 16n2 ￿ 32n3 C 16n4 C 18s2 C 60s3 C 59s4 C 18s5





4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2
i￿2
b￿1 .a ￿ 2bc/2
￿.224ns C 112n2 ￿ 224n3 C 112n4 C 112s2 C 364s3 C 544s4 C 395s5
C108s6 C 572ns2 ￿ 16n2s C 680ns3 ￿ 416n3s C 288ns4 C 208n4s
￿380n2s2 ￿ 680n2s3 ￿ 384n3s2 ￿ 288n2s4 C 192n4s2/:
￿ The proof for Proposition 1
The comparisons of the uniform termination outcomes with collusive reciprocal termination
outcomes are as follows,
tU
1 ￿ c D
.a ￿ 2bc/[2.1 ￿ n/ C s].n C s/
￿




2 ￿ c D
.a ￿ 2bc/.1 ￿ n C s/.2n C s/
￿
4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿
.1 ￿ n/b
> 0;







.a ￿ 2bc/.1 ￿ n C s/.2n C s/
2
￿






.a ￿ 2bc/.1 ￿ n C s/.2n C s/
2
￿






.a ￿ 2bc/[2.1 ￿ n/ C s].n C s/
2
￿








4n.1 ￿ n/ C 3s C 2s2￿
2
￿
























.64ns C 32n2 ￿ 144n3 C 192n4 ￿ 80n5 C 32s2 C 64s3 C 40s4
C8s5 C 4ns2 ￿ 208n2s ￿ 144ns3 C 80n3s ￿ 116ns4 C 112n4s
￿27ns5 ￿ 48n5s ￿ 304n2s2 ￿ 96n2s3 C 220n3s2 C 72n3s3/
￿
















.176n3 ￿ 48n2 ￿ 96ns ￿ 208n4 C 80n5 ￿ 48s2 ￿ 104s3 ￿ 76s4
￿19s5 ￿ 56ns2 C 224n2s C 120ns3 ￿ 48n3s C 116ns4 ￿ 128n4s
C27ns5 C 48n5s C 356n2s2 C 120n2s3 ￿ 220n3s2 ￿ 72n3s3/
￿




is depicted in Figure (A.1.4).
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Both Figure (A.1.3) and (A.1.4) show that the small network makes more pro￿t compared












16n2 .1 ￿ n/2 .1 C s/ C s2 ￿


















16n2 .1 ￿ n/2 C s2 ￿
20s C 7s2 C 14
￿
C 8sn .1 ￿ n/.3s C 4/
￿
4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿2 < 0:







16n2 .1 ￿ n/2 .11s C 5/ C 4
￿




308s C 332s2 C 109s3 C 80
￿￿
￿
4n.1 ￿ n/ C 4s C 3s2￿2 < 0;
A.2 Asymmetric regulation on the ￿xed network
￿ The proof for Proposition 2
The comparisons of the asymmetric regulation outcomes with collusive reciprocal termination
ones are as follows.
(i) t R
F1 > c and t R
F2 > c are followed from equations (43) and (44).













































1 C ￿ R
2 C ￿ R
F < ￿ R
1 C ￿ R
2 C ￿ R
F,
and W R < W￿ can be veri￿ed by comparing the above equilibrium with that in the case of
collusive reciprocal termination charges.
A.3 Direct calling price regulation
￿ The equilibrium outcomes









[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]b









[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]b




[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]b
[2a C 4bc C .2a ￿ bc/n.1 ￿ n/]: (67)
31By substituting equations (63)￿(67) and (50) into (1)￿(4) we solve the equilibrium pro￿ts
￿ D




[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 b
￿
￿





.a ￿ 2bc/2.1 ￿ n/
[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 b
￿
￿




.a ￿ 2bc/2.1 ￿ n/
￿
2n C n2 ￿ 6n3 C 3n4 C 4
￿
s
[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 b
;
W D D
.a ￿ 2bc/2.1 ￿ n/
2[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 b
￿.96s ￿ 16n C 28ns ￿ 23n2 C 69n3 ￿ 12n4 ￿ 27n5 C 9n6 C 64s2
C48ns2 ￿ 26n2s ￿ 4n3s C 2n4s ￿ 39n2s2 ￿ 18n3s2 C 9n4s2 C 64/:
￿ The proof for Proposition 3
In Proposition 3, (i) and (ii) are proved by comparing equations (63)￿(67) and (50) with p￿
ij D
1










.a ￿ 2bc/n.1 C 3n/





5.a ￿ 2bc/n.1 ￿ n/





.a ￿ 2bc/.1 ￿ n/[1 C 3.1 ￿ n/]




























32For the proof of (iii) and (iv), we compare pro￿ts, consumer surplus and social welfare re-
sulted from the direct calling price with those from the collusive reciprocal termination regime.












.32s ￿ 368n ￿ 104ns ￿ 245n2 C 450n3 C 15n4
￿144n5 C 36n6 C 71n2s C 10n3s ￿ 9n4s C 192/















D2 D .1 ￿ n/
.295n2 ￿ 32ns ￿ 48n C 210n3 ￿ 165n4 ￿ 72n5
C36n6 C 47n2s C 26n3s ￿ 9n4s ￿ 64/




is depicted in Figure (A.3.2). Both Figure (A.3.1) and (A.3.2) show that small network makes




















































n .1 ￿ n/
￿




3n2 ￿ 3n ￿ 8
￿2
8 C 3.1 ￿ n/
< 0;
is depicted in Figure (A.3.3).
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.25n2 ￿ 176ns ￿ 208n C 330n3 ￿ 75n4 ￿ 108n5 C 36n6 C 64s2 C 48ns2
C130n2s C 92n3s ￿ 46n4s ￿ 39n2s2 ￿ 18n3s2 C 9n4s2 C 64/
[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 ;
is depicted in Figure (A.3.4).
To analyse the regulation effect on social welfare, it is helpful to look into the regulation
effect on consumer surplus CS and the aggregate industry pro￿t 5 D .￿1 C ￿2 C ￿ F/. The
consumer surplus with regulatory calling price CSU and that with collusive termination charge
CS￿ can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium outcomes in the two regimes into equation
(5): The difference .CSU ￿ CS￿/ is






.75n2 ￿ 144ns ￿ 624n C 990n3 ￿ 225n4 ￿ 324n5 C 108n6 C 192s2 C 144ns2
C70n2s C 148n3s ￿ 74n4s ￿ 117n2s2 ￿ 54n3s2 C 27n4s2 C 192/
[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 ;
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Figure (A.3.4) and (A.3.5) show that the regulatory direct pricing bene￿ts consumer and
social welfare more when the sizes of mobile network are asymmetric. This can also be con-
￿rmed by n = arg min.W D ￿ W￿/ = arg min.CSD ￿ CS￿/ D 0:5:
We then compare the industry pro￿t under direct calling price regulation 5D with that
under collusive termination charge 5￿ and ￿nd that






.16ns ￿ 208n C 25n2 C 330n3 ￿ 75n4 ￿ 108n5 C 36n6 C 64s2
C48ns2 ￿ 30n2s C 28n3s ￿ 14n4s ￿ 39n2s2 ￿ 18n3s2 C 9n4s2 C 64/
[8 C 3.1 ￿ n/]2 < 0:
35is depicted in Figure (A.3.6). It shows that the industry pro￿t is worse off when the sizes of
























From the comparisons above, we conclude that the direct regulation on the calling price is
more welcomed by theconsumers and the small network with the existenceof partial consumer
ignorance.
B Complete Consumer Ignorance
￿ The proof for Proposition 5
(i) Recall that the collusive prices p￿
iM D p￿
iF D p￿ D 1
2b￿1.a C 2bc/. Comparing equations
e pi with p￿ derives the following results.
e pD
1 ￿ p￿ D
.a ￿ 2bc/
2b
.￿2 C ￿F ￿ ￿1/;
e pD
2 ￿ p￿ D
.a ￿ 2bc/
2b
.￿1 C ￿F ￿ ￿2/;
e pD
F ￿ p￿ D
.a ￿ 2bc/
2b
.￿1 C ￿2 ￿ ￿F/:
The difference between regulatory and non-regulatory calling price mainly depends on the
relative market share.
36(ii) By comparing e ￿ D
i with ￿￿
i D 1
4b￿1.a C 2bc/￿i.1 C s/, and equation e W Dwith W￿ in
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4n2 ￿ 2s C 3s2 ￿ 1
￿
.1 ￿ n/
.1 C s/2 ;













































8n2 ￿ 2s ￿ 8n ￿ s2 C 3
￿
s
.1 C s/2 ;
is depicted in Figure (B.3).







4n2 ￿ s ￿ 16ns ￿ 4n ￿ s2 C s3 C 16n2s C 1
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Figure B.4: 4W
The Figure (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) all show that, with complete consumer ignorance, only
the small ￿rms can make more pro￿t compared to the case with unregulated calling price. Be-
cause of the decrease in the aggregate industry pro￿t and consumer surplus, the social welfare
decrease and which is con￿rmed in Figure (B.4).
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